As normas de dupla vacância do cargo de Chefe do Poder Executivo e sua (in)observância obrigatória pelos Estados

Abstract

The scope of this work is to study the hypotheses of impediment and vacancy of the Chief of the Executive Branch set out in the Federal Constitution, through analysis of the legal provisions and the observations of the majority doctrine that deal with the topic, based on bibliographical reviews. Furthermore, focus will be placed on the situation of double vacancy occurring at the state level, based on the perception of the lack of regulation of the topic by the Federal Constitution. In this sense, decisions of the Federal Supreme Court will be analyzed that demonstrate the Court's position regarding the possibility of the federative entity having, or not, autonomy to determine the rules of the procedure for choosing the new successor. The conclusions of the work are directed towards the observation that the legal provisions that deal with double vacancy at the federal level, set out in the Federal Constitution, are not mandatory for member states to observe. However, federated entities must observe the constitutional principles that involve political organization, especially democratic and republican principles. The methodological basis used is the use of theoretical-dogmatic research, especially through jurisprudential analysis relevant to the topic.